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ABSTRACT 
This article seeks to explore the phenomenon of the so-called ‘paedophile hunters’. These are 
members of the public who see themselves as protecting children by visiting social media sites 
posing as children and engaging with adults who seek to exploit children sexually. They typically 
film subsequent encounters with the adults involved and pass the information to the police to 
investigate as a potential sexual offence. While the police condemn these activities as vigilantism, 
it is clear that both the police and courts will act upon the evidence. However, questions are 
being asked about whether hunters entrap those that they suspect of abuse, and whether the 




In recent years, so-called paedophile hunters have captured the imagination of the public while 
causing the police a degree of concern. The hunters are ordinary members of the public who 
adopt the persona of a child on social media. In that persona, they communicate with adults 
whom they suspect of being interested in child sex. The suspect typicallyengage with the “child” 
in sexual conversation, and ultimately he seeks to meet the child for sex. When the suspect turns 
up to the meeting, he (as the suspect is inevitably male) is confronted and filmed, with the 
footage then being sent to the police (or, in some cases, the police being told of the meeting in 
advance).  
 
Paedophile hunters pose challenges to the criminal justice system. While they argue that they are 
filling a void left by the police,1 the police are concerned that the hunters do not appreciate the 
complexities of online investigations, and can even prejudice police investigations.2 However, at 
the same time, the police are prepared to use the evidence gathered by the hunters. Evidence 
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gathered by hunters has led to 150 convictions in England & Wales during the twelve months to 
April 2018.3 Recently, the courts have been called upon to identify the limits of the behaviour 
undertaken by the hunters. In R v TL4 , the Court of Appeal held that paedophile hunters 
should, in assessing whether their conduct amounts to entrapment, be measured against a 
different standard of behaviour to the police. However, there are limits to what is acceptable 
conduct on their part. Two contrasting Crown Court cases demonstrate the difficulties their 
conduct poses. In R v Walters and Ali5 Langstaff J. rejected an application to stay an indictment 
based on the activities of a paedophile hunter, whereas in R v Slusalarczik6 HHJ Blair QC did stay 
an indictment, stating that the activities of paedophile hunters brought the criminal justice 
system into disrepute as had occurred in that case. 
 
This article seeks to explore the phenomenon of paedophile hunters and identify the challenges 
that their activities bring to the criminal justice system. In particular, it will consider how the 
courts should treat applications to stay indictments as an abuse of process where it is alleged that 
the hunters have unfairly entrapped the suspect. 
 
THE PAEDOPHILE HUNTER 
It is difficult to identify when the concept of the paedophile hunter entered the public 
consciousness, although a milestone moment was undoubtedly the airing on US networked 
television of the show ‘To Catch a Predator’.7 This show began in 2004 and presented itself as a 
news network joining forces with a vigilante group (and later the police) to try and catch those 
who were seeking to solicit children online for sex.8 The undercover civilian would be filmed 
talking to a suspect, with the latter believing that they were talking to a child. They would arrange 
a meeting with the ‘child’, almost always at the child’s house, whereupon the reporter would 
confront them, accompanied by a TV crew. When the suspect tried to leave, they would be 
arrested by the police who had allowed the meeting to go ahead. The footage (which remains 
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widely available on social media sites such as YouTube) is invariably accompanied by high-
octane footage of police arriving with red and blue flashing lights and guns drawn. 
 
To Catch a Predator was, at least in ratings terms, a huge hit. However, it raised some 
uncomfortable questions, many of which continue today and are discussed below. The show 
ultimately ended, in part because it was linked to a small number of suicides. One saw William 
Conradt, a Texas lawyer, confronted on the show and realising the consequences of what was 
happening, chose to shoot himself in the house that he had attended in the hope of meeting the 
child.9 Other suicides led some to question the ethics of what was happening, although the 
popularity of the show suggested that the general public was perhaps more forgiving of the TV 
executives actions. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the attention that it attracted, people in the UK soon started to act 
as paedophile hunters. Again, it is not clear when this phenomenon began in the UK, but the 
activity has thrived, with the courts recently describing it as a ‘cottage industry’.10 Unlike in 
America, paedophile hunters are not a form of mainstream entertainment. Journalists initially 
began posing as children when the issue of online grooming first came to prominence. So, for 
example, the BBC ran a story on how easy it was to groom a child online. This story involved a 
journalist pretending to be a schoolgirl and turning up to meet her contact.11 The BBC broadcast 
the meeting as part of the ‘6 o’clock news’, one of the most important news programmes in the 
UK. Some (print) journalists followed this pattern when engaging in similar activity, but again 
these incidents were presented as news rather than entertainment. Eventually, Channel 4 
presented a documentary on the work of paedophile hunters,12 but it did so in a way that showed 
all sides of the argument, including presenting the views of police officers and social workers 
who argued that the actions of the hunters were inappropriate. Again, the presentation was more 
as a news story than as entertainment. 
 
The Channel 4 documentary was perhaps the first that looked at the phenomenon of the 
‘paedophile hunter’ rather than the issue of grooming. The documentary was broadcast at a time 
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when traditional forms of entertainment, such as television, were arguably becoming eclipsed by 
social media and online news. Traditional broadcasting rules do not constrain these formats and 
allow a message to be sent directly to those interested in such matters.13 Certainly, paedophile 
hunters have adopted social media in earnest. Not only do individual collectives operate their 
sites, but they come together to publicise what they do. ‘UK Hunters Stream’14 is a website that 
presents the activities of many paedophile hunter groups. The site includes an explanation of 
what the hunters do and why and even tries to provide educational advice to parents and the 
wider public. UK Hunters Stream collect statistics on what the groups do and present reports of 
successful stings. The site is intended to try to show that the activity is worthy. The presentation 
of statistics and reports is partly to try and legitimise their activities. The reports are akin to 
statistics and messages put out by police forces. The site is careful not to glamorise what they do 
and instead presents the information in a measured way. That said, it also provides links to the 
individual pages of paedophile hunters, which often include footage of the meetings between 
hunter and hunted. Thus, the hunters can present their activities to the wider public without 
being subject to the questioning that often arises when engaging with the mainstream media. 
 
The relationship between police and paedophile hunters 
What relationship exists between paedophile hunters and the police? If over 150 convictions 
have succeeded, then it would seem, at face value, that the relationship should be positive, but 
that is not the case. The official position of the NPCC is that paedophile hunters are vigilantes, 
and the police will not condone their actions.15 Indeed, recently there was a discussion about the 
police adopting a policy of arresting paedophile hunters where they were found to have engaged 
in criminality, including harassment.16 Presumably, the intention was to dissuade individuals from 
acting as paedophile hunters. If so, the policy was unsuccessful, and at least anecdotally, the 
police appear to have resiled from this stance.  
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The hunters frequently state that there is commonly local-level co-operation.17 Of course, it is 
easy to say this without proof, but it would not be difficult to believe that some police officers 
will be broadly supportive of the activities. At a practical level, there is a link, in thatmost hunters 
will pass the evidence to the police, and the courts have noted that such information will 
invariably require investigation.18 The fact that hunters supply the police information means that 
there is, at the very least, alignment between the activities of the hunters and the police,19 even if 
no official relationship exists. 
 
Should the relationship change? A radical suggestion was put forward by Jim Gamble, the 
former Assistant Chief Constable and founding chief executive of CEOP (Child Exploitation and 
Online Protection Centre). Gamble has suggested that paedophile hunters could be recruited by the 
police to act as special constables.20 While this idea has been rejected by many in authority, it is 
perhaps not as extreme as it may sound. Note, that Gamble was not suggesting that the police 
should simply accept what the hunters do. Rather, he suggested recruiting hunters as Special 
Constables. This would mean that they would become sworn constables and would be the 
subject of regulation in the same way that ordinary police officers are. In other words, the 
hunters would no longer be able to act in the way that they do now, but instead would be trained 
in how to conduct undercover operations in compliance with the law and following appropriate 
legal safeguards,21 including potentially requiring authorisation as a covert human intelligence 
source.22 
 
Realistically, it is unlikely that many paedophile hunters would choose to join the police, even if 
the police suddenly decided to permit it. Many argue that they became paedophile hunters 
because they think the police are over-regulated and constrained in such operations.23 It is 
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unlikely that their concerns would go away. However, that means the relationship between police 
and hunter is likely to remain one of distrust.  
THE COURTS’ RESPONSE 
Notwithstanding the number of successful prosecutions that have followed the activities of 
paedophile hunters, concern has grown about the appropriateness of accepting the evidence of 
‘vigilantes’. Defence advocates began to challenge prosecutions based on the evidence gathered 
by paedophile hunters. There are two principal avenues of attack. The first is that the police 
circumvent the rules of covert policing by relying on the evidence, and second is that the 
conduct of paedophile hunters constitutes entrapment. 
 
Circumventing the rules 
The first argument put forward is that while the police officially denies any relationship exists 
between them and paedophile hunters, the use of the evidence means that prosecutions are 
taking place without the oversight that would exist if the police were to conduct the operations. 
In essence, the argument that the police turn a ‘blind eye’ and thus allow suspects to be targeted 
proactively in such a way that circumvents the laws regulating covert surveillance. 
 
The police do undertake proactive operations similar to those undertaken by paedophile 
hunters.24 When they do so, they are subject to both internal and external regulation. The 
internal procedures will ordinarily involve management approval and oversight of the 
operation.25 This assures that the operation is conducted legitimately and that the safety of 
everyone involved is assured. However, these are matters of internal guidance. The existence of 
this internal guidance does not support an argument that paedophile hunters are acting contrary 
to the law by not being subject to them. The existence of the rules will assist in gaining positive 
outcomes, but the same is true of lots of types of police work, where rules, procedures and 
authorisations are commonplace but not required in law.  
 
The second form of authorisation is more complicated. Where a police officer goes online 
pretending to be a child to talk to a suspect, that officer will be establishing or maintaining a 
personal or other relationship. In other words, the officer will be a covert human intelligence 
                                                 
24 HMIC, An Inspection of Undercover Policing in England and Wales (TSO 2014) 150.  
25 See, for example, the comments of the Lord Chief Justice in R v TL [2018] EWCA Crim 1821 at [20]-[21]. 
source (CHIS).26 Where the police wish to use a CHIS, including an undercover officer, then 
they need an appropriate authority27 for both the ‘use’ of the CHIS and their ‘conduct’.28 These 
authorisations are subject to scrutiny by the judicial commissioners (previously the ‘Surveillance 
Commissioners’) based in the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office.29 While the scrutiny 
is retrospective, it would still be extremely embarrassing for the police to be criticised for acting 
inappropriately, and thus the police will follow the guidance of the Commissioners.  
 
In R v Walters and Ali30 the defendants sought to argue that paedophile hunters were CHIS and 
therefore required authority for their work. If the hunters were not authorised as CHIS this, the 
defendants argued, meant that the prosecution amounted to an abuse of process. Langstaff J. did 
not accept these submissions. He accepted that the activities met the definition of a CHIS,31 but 
that is unsurprising given the breadth of the definition of that concept. It encompasses all those 
who covertly establish or maintain a personal or other relationship to, inter alia, obtain or disclose 
information. Paedophile hunters will fall within this definition as would many private 
investigators. However, Langstaff J. noted that falling within the definition is largely irrelevant. 
Despite the Act’s name, RIPA 2000 does not fully regulate investigatory powers. It regulates some 
regulatory powers exercised by some organisations. It was a response to the passing of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. While the traditional approach in England & Wales has been to consider 
anything not illegal to be lawful, this contrasts with the approach of the European Court of 
Human Rights who require a clear legal basis for any interference with a right under Article 8. 
Thus, surveillance powers have previously been declared a breach of Article 8 by that Court 
because they did not have any statutory basis.32 RIPA 2000 was designed to put the principal 
investigatory powers exercised by public authorities onto a statutory footing, providing a legal 
basis to defend any action brought under s.7, Human Rights Act 1998. 
 
That RIPA 2000 does not regulate all forms of covert surveillance can be seen from s.80 which 
provides that a failure to authorise conduct does not render it unlawful. Similarly, s.80(b) does 
not require the exercise of any power or authority. If the Act were truly to regulate all forms of 
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investigatory powers, then it would permit only those powers that comply with the Act be used, 
declaring all others to be unlawful.  
 
Langstaff J. ruled that the mere fact that a person is acting as a CHIS does not mean that they 
have to be authorised. RIPA 2000 is permissive; it allows the police to authorise a source, but it 
does not require them to do so. The mere fact that someone’s actions mean that he meets the 
definition of a CHIS is irrelevant if the police are not using that person. Obviously where they 
do use them, as, for example when the police make use of informants, then the position is 
different, but that is because of the relationship that exists between the source and the police. In 
Walters and Ali counsel for the defendants admitted that it could not be shown that there was an 
obvious link between the police and the paedophile hunter. Counsel expressly disavowed any 
suggestion of bad conduct on behalf of the police (through, for example, covering up any such 
link).33 Langstaff J. expressly rejected the suggestion that a link could be established by 
association and ruled that it required co-operation. Counsel submitted that the fact the police 
attended the meeting to arrest the suspect showed condonation and complicity, but Langstaff J. 
pointed out that to do otherwise would arguably be a breach of the police’s duty to investigate.34  
 
This latter point is extremely important. While there is some doubt as to whether the police owe 
a general duty to investigate all crime,35 there is less doubt that such a duty exists in respect of 
child abuse cases. The sexual abuse and exploitation of children can engage Article 3 of the 
ECHR.36 Article 3 imposes positive obligations on the state, i.e. it must take steps to protect a 
child from abuse, not just react to abuse after it has happened.37 Let us take the following 
(plausible) example: 
 
D has been chatting with two ‘girls’ (X and Y) purportedly aged 14 online. He arranges 
to meet X on Monday night and Y on Tuesday night. In fact, X is a paedophile hunter 
posing as a child. X passes on all the information that shows D has engaged in sexually-
explicit conversation with X and clearly intends to have sexual intercourse with X. The 
police decline to attend, arrest or question D. On Tuesday, he meets Y, who is, in fact, a 
14-year-old girl  and sexually assaults her. 
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One could imagine the press headlines that might accompany such a case. Equally, the law would 
take a dim view of the police decision to decline to investigate D.38 Thus, where the police attend 
a meeting arranged by a paedophile hunter, it is not that they are condoning the hunter’s actions, 
but rather it is a pragmatic decision to investigate whether an individual may have committed a 




The second argument advanced to exclude the evidence gathered by the hunters is that the 
activities of paedophile hunters constitute entrapment. As is well known, in England & Wales, 
entrapment does not exist as a substantive defence.93 Instead, where entrapment exists, it is used 
to mitigate sentence,94 justify the exclusion of evidence,95 or as grounds to seek a stay of 
proceedings as an abuse of process.96 Where the entrapment is by the state, the last has become 
the default position,97 but it is less clear that this is the appropriate result for private entrapment. 
 
Defining entrapment 
What is entrapment? As it is not a defence, it has not been particularly well defined. Even R v 
Looseley, which is the leading authority on entrapment, did not fully articulate what entrapment 
was. Lord Hoffman arguably gave the clearest definition when he stated that it was, ‘when an 
agent of the state – usually a law enforcement officer or a controlled informer – causes someone 
to commit an offence in order that he should be prosecuted’.98 Lord Nicholls argued that it was 
when ‘the state through its agents should lure its citizens into committing acts forbidden by the 
law and then seek to prosecute them for doing so’.99 ‘Lure’ is certainly less tangible than ‘cause’ 
and Lord Nicholls notes that the problem with ‘lure’, ‘incite’, ‘entice’ and ‘instigate’ is that they 
are very imprecise. His Lordship notes that test purchasing operations are an example of 
circumstances when there is no entrapment,100 and this must be true of Lord Hoffman’s 
definition. For example, if the state sends a 16-year-old into a shop to purchase alcohol, then the 
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state has caused (to use Lord Hoffman’s definition) the shop to commit an offence.101 Yet, this 
will not be objected to because it is considered to be a legitimate tactic to combat the illegal sale 
of alcohol.102 The same is true of other test-purchases including, for example, drugs. 
 
Perhaps entrapment should, therefore, be better defined as the unfair causing of a person to 
commit an offence. Certainly, this would better echo the approach that the courts have taken to 
such cases. In Looseley it was noted that the reason for committing the offence was important. 
Lord Nicholls notes, ‘if the defendant already had the intent to commit a crime of the same or 
similar kind, then the police did no more than give him the opportunity to fulfil his existing 
intent’.103 So, for example, in the context of drugs; a suspect was always going to sell drugs to 
someone, they just happened to sell them to a police officer. Lord Hoffman agreed with this, 
although he noted that ascertaining that this was going to be the case will not always be easy.104 
He also noted that while it is an appropriate test for regulatory matters, ‘ordinary members of the 
public do not become involved in large scale drug dealing, conspiracy to rob…or hiring 
assassins’.105 
 
Both Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffman referred to entrapment being by the state. Lord Nicholls, 
in particular, noting that this would include an informant because they are engaging on behalf of 
the state. While entrapment will ordinarily be through the state, the courts have accepted the 
possibility that a private citizen could commit entrapment through acting as an agent 
provocateur. In R v Shannon106 a TV actor was tricked into supplying drugs by a journalist for the 
News of the World. The Court of Appeal accepted that, in principle, the actions of an agent 
provocateur could affect the fairness of proceedings but noted that the judge at first instance had 
held that the defendant had supplied the drugs without any pressure.107 In other words, that it 
did not constitute entrapment on the facts of this case. Journalistic excesses were also considered 
in Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v General Medical Council and Saluja,108 which 
concerned regulatory proceedings. A doctor was accused of misconduct following a journalistic 
investigation into doctors falsely accused of signing people as unfit to work. The GMC stayed 
the proceedings on the basis that they felt the journalist had entrapped the doctor, but the High 
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Court quashed this stay, noting that the conduct did not constitute entrapment.109 In part, this 
was because they did not find that the conduct was anything other than unexceptionable, and 
partly because they considered that some forms of misconduct would only be detected by 
offering inducements.110 
 
From these cases, it can be seen that entrapment can be summarised as unfair activity that causes 
a person to commit a criminal offence by inappropriately tricking, pressurising or inducing them. 
Importantly, this recognises that there will be circumstances when offering an opportunity to 
commit a crime will be legitimate, not least when all a person did was to offer the suspect an 
unexceptional opportunity to commit an offence that the suspect would have otherwise been 
willing to have done. 111 
 
How does this apply to paedophile hunter cases? It will be remembered from earlier sections that 
paedophile hunters invariably pretend to be children and seek to meet people online. Depending 
on what form the conversation takes, a person talking to the ‘child’ could commit a variety of 
offences. The most obvious would be sexual communication with a child112 (where the 
conversation is sexual and the defendant engaged in the conversation for the purposes of sexual 
gratification), meeting a child following grooming113 (where the suspect and the ‘child’ 
communicate on at least one occasion and the suspect meets the ‘child’, travels to meet or causes 
the child to travel for a meeting, and at that meeting intends to commit a child sex offence) or 
arranging or facilitating a child sexual offence114 (where the suspect puts in place arrangements 
that will allow him to commit a sexual offence).115 The question is the extent to which it can be 
said that their conduct is inappropriate: i.e. do they seek to unduly pressurise or induce a suspect, 
or do they simply provide an opportunity to commit an offence that the suspect was fully 
prepared to commit? 
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This is an issue that has received recent judicial attention. Two cases are presented here because 
they reached very different conclusions; that is the decision in R v TL,116 which was first heard in 
the Crown Court at Nottingham, and then ultimately in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 
and R v Slusalarczik,117 a first-instance decision in the Crown Court at Bristol before the 
Honorary Recorder of Bristol, HHJ Blair QC. 
 
In TL a paedophile hunter known only as ‘Mr U’ adopted the persona of ‘Bexie’, a 14-year-old 
girl. The profile of ‘Bexie’ stated, ‘Hiya am just your average 14-year-old girl looking to meet new 
friends’.118 Someone using the suspect’s computer 119 had posted a message asking for a 
threesome. When ‘Bexie’ replied and said that she was inexperienced, the reply was, ‘It’s ok we 
are experienced we will learn u and u can join in on sex as threesome’. ‘Bexie’ and TL engaged in 
conversation that made it clear that TL wanted to have sex. It culminated in TL asking ‘Bexie’ 
whether she wanted to meet with them after school to have sex.120 ‘Bexie’ expressly referred to 
her age and asked whether it bothered TL, to which the reply was ‘no’. After they discussed sex, 
TL sent a photograph of condoms to reassure ‘Bexie’ that she would not fall pregnant.121 
 
TL arranged a time when Bexie would turn up at the house. At that time, Mr U, other 
paedophile hunters and the police turned up. TL was charged with attempting to meet a child 
following grooming etc.,122 but he sought a stay of prosecution arguing that he had been 
entrapped. The judge at first instance (HHJ Sampson) held that TL had been the victim of 
entrapment. The judge ruled that the photograph that accompanied ‘Bexie’s’ profile showed a 
picture of someone who was ‘at least 14, but could be older, including 18 or more’.123 He found 
that there was no reasonable suspicion against TL and that, in essence, the offence had been 
created by ‘Bexie’. He decided that because paedophile hunters try to behave like self-appointed 
internet police then, ‘it seems to me the common law principle against entrapment should apply 
to this private citizens’ operation, in the same manner as it would apply to a police operation’.124 
For reasons set out later, he stayed the prosecution as an abuse of process. 
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The facts of Slusalarczik were not dissimilar. A paedophile hunter known as Mr Webb created an 
online persona of a 14-year-old girl known as ‘Lou’. The profile said that Lou’s age was 18, 
although it was agreed that this was, in part, because the site could not be accessed by someone 
claiming to be under 18, and that children did use the site. The profile picture was of a 20-year-
old woman. ‘Lou’ and Slusalarczik began to talk after a general message was sent out to lots of 
people saying, ‘I would love to have a chat and get to know each other a bit if you are up for 
that’.125 
 
Slusalarczik replied and ‘Lou’ said quickly, ‘Just want a honest, I’m 14, is my age OK for you? 
Puts some off’. The defendant replied, ‘You don’t look 14 but that’s fine I guess’. They then 
have a conversation about school. After a break, ‘Lou’ sends a message saying, ‘Shall I be honest 
about what I want? I want to lose my [virginity]’. ‘She’ then says, ‘You look cute, so do you want 
to do it?’ to which the defendant replied, ‘Thanks, and yeah I’m up for it. We can do whatever 
you want’. He later says, ‘Well, I wouldn’t want to just meet and fuck straight away. I get that you 
want to get it over and done with but you can at least work up to it’. ‘Lou’ at one point says, ‘I 
can prove I’m real too. I’ll take a pic in a min doing something you ask me to’, although there is 
no evidence that Slusalarczik did indeed ask her to send a picture. 
 
During Mr Webb’s cross-examination, he noted that paedophile hunters cooperate in training 
themselves to know what they can, and cannot do evidentially. In the cross-examination, he 
agreed that ‘[I] should not maybe have started turning the conversation sexual’ and then added, 
‘But he should not have continued it’.126 It is also notable that after this cross-examination, the 
jury asked the judge what the law of entrapment was. 
 
After the cross-examination, counsel for the defence sought a stay of the prosecution as an abuse 
of process based on entrapment. He expressly averred that he was not making a submission that 
there was no case to answer and that he was seeking a stay. The judge agreed, stating that ‘I am 
of the view that this is of such an exceptional nature that this offence that is alleged would not 
have occurred but for the deliberate entrapment by Mr Webb of the Defendant by turning a 
conversation that was otherwise one of a general chat into one of a sexual wish, which was 
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pursued when it looked as though the Defendant might be going a little bit cold or having 
suspicions as to the veracity of this fictional profile which Mr Webb had created’.127 
 
Did the activities, in either case, constitute entrapment? The Court of Appeal ruled that there 
was no entrapment in TL. The Court of Appeal noted that the hunter ‘committed no offences in 
the course of his conduct’,128 and used limited deception. They noted that while the profile 
picture was someone aged 18, the hunter had immediately announced that he was a 14-year-old 
girl.129 The Court of Appeal did not consider that he induced TL to commit an offence, he 
simply acted the part of a 14-year-old girl and responded in the way that one would if they were 
being groomed. They ultimately concluded, ‘This is far removed from a case of incitement in the 
sense of one person pushing another towards committing an offence which he would otherwise 
not commit’.130 In other words, there was no entrapment. Professor Hungerford-Welch has 
noted that if the police had done what the hunter, in this case, had done, there would have been 
no viable argument of entrapment,131 something Judge Sampson did not appear to appreciate. 
 
What of Slusalarczik? Here, the position is arguably more complicated. There are some 
similarities to TL. Both used an adult photograph with a profile implying a girl of an older age, 
but both referred to themselves as being a 14-year-old girl at the very beginning of the 
conversations. While Judge Blair considered the profile important, it is submitted that it was not. 
Many chatrooms require a person to be over a certain age to join. Invariably adolescents will 
provide false details to access these sites; indeed it is a common occurrence as few chatrooms 
require the age to be verified.132 Thus, the profile in both Slusalarczik and TL cannot be 
considered anything other than an unexceptional circumstance. 
 
It is clear in Slusalarczik that the hunter took the lead a number of times. This can be contrasted 
to TL, where the Court of Appeal expressly noted that this did not happen.133 Does this take us 
closer to the concept of being lured? While there was persistence, there was no pressure. There 
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were no threats or badgering. When the suspect went quiet, the hunter would take the lead. This 
conduct is more proactive than that the police would ordinarily engage in, but, again, it does not 
follow that it this is unusual. Society has historically inferred innocence on children, believing 
that they are not sexual,134 and thus many may find it easier to believe that it is adults that initiate 
the sexual conversation. In fact, research has shown that this is far from true and that 
adolescents are more than capable of initiating sexual conversations with strangers.135  
 
Did the hunter in Slusalarczik go too far? That is a difficult question to answer. Taking the lead 
on turning the conversation sexual is not something that the police would do, but, as noted 
above, it is not dissimilar to what happens in adolescent chatrooms every day. Therefore, it is 
perhaps unexceptional. Why is taking the lead in saying, “do you want to have sex?” any different 
to a police officer saying, “Hello, mate, can you sort us out a couple of bags [of drugs]?”.137 We 
are perhaps more comfortable with a request for drugs than arranging illegal sex with a child, but 
perhaps this is a good example of Lord Hoffman’s point in Looseley that ordinary people not 
trying to engage assassins. Ordinary adults do not try to have sex with 14-year-old girls, but, if 
they do, they may find that sometimes the child leads. 
 
Counsel for the defence argued that there was clearly encouragement rather than enticement,138 
and the judge agreed. He concluded, ‘…but for the deliberate entrapment by Mr Webb of the 
Defendant by turning a conversation that was otherwise one of a general chat into one of a 
sexual wish, which was pursued when it looked as though the Defendant might be going a little 
cold…’.139 As noted above, it can be questioned whether this is necessarily any different to what 
is expected within a teenage chatroom. More than this, however, it arguably misunderstands the 
offence. There would be a greater argument for entrapment if the defendant had been charged 
with sexual communication with a child.140 That offence prohibits the intentional sexual 
communication with a child for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification. Clearly, if a 
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paedophile hunter is the one who constantly keeps the conversation sexual, then it could be 
argued that this was entrapment.141 
 
However, Slusalarczik was not charged with this, he was charged with attempting to meet a child 
following grooming etc.142 Thus, it was not the conversation that is crucial, but it is the meeting 
with the ‘child’. 
 
Counsel for the prosecution notes that Slusalarczik had plenty of opportunities to say, ‘I’m not 
interested’. Instead, when asked whether he wants to meet and have sex with a 14-year-old, he 
replied, ‘…yeah, I’m up for it. We can do whatever you want’.143 Counsel continues, ‘And so yes, 
Mr Webb goes further than the police would have done…but this is not a case where he 
repeatedly brings up, pesters, badgers or persuades, he offers explicitly rather than implicitly, but 
it is entirely for Mr Slusalarczik, or anybody else in that position responds’.144  Slusalaraczik’s 
conversations with the hunter discussed the sexual activities that they could undertake, asks 
about previous experience and voluntarily, and clearly, agrees to a meeting with ‘Lou’. There 
were opportunities for him to decide, “I’m arranging to meet a 14-year-old girl for sex. That’s 
wrong”. But he did not. Had he failed to turn up to the meeting, no charge could have been 
proffered. It is the meeting that is key. In the absence of unfair badgering into a person meeting 
then, it is submitted, there is arguably no entrapment.  
  
 
One final point of relevance in defining entrapment is the issue about whether the police and 
private citizens should be held to the same standard as regards the conduct they can engage in 
without entrapping someone. The judge at first instance in TL held that the same standard 
applied, something the Court of Appeal disagreed with.146 However, the Court of Appeal then 
confused matters by stating, ‘a starting point…is to ask whether the same, or similar conduct by 
the police’ would constitute entrapment.147 In fairness, the Court of Appeal continue and note 
that it is only a starting point and that the ‘police are subject to codes of conduct and hierarchical 
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oversight’. This latter point is important and is why there is a different standard. The police, who 
are handed key powers of investigation and enforcement, receive specialist training before being 
authorised to act as undercover investigators. They have all the resources of the National Police 
Chief’s Council and the Crown Prosecution Service to ensure that they do not cross the line. 
Private citizens do not. They cannot, therefore, be expected to act in the same way that a highly 
trained police officer would. Ultimately, the test is whether the paedophile hunter has gone 
beyond offering an unexceptional opportunity and has unfairly caused a person to commit an 
offence that they would not otherwise have done so. In determining that, there is likely to be 
higher standards of transparency for the police than there would for paedophile hunters. 
 
Remedy for entrapment 
 
Assuming that a paedophile hunter does go too far and is found to have entrapped a suspect, 
what should the remedy be? The first-instance judges in both TL and Slusalarczik decided the 
appropriate remedy was to stay the prosecution as an abuse of process. This was undoubtedly 
because in Looseley, the House of Lords had indicated that a stay was the usual remedy.148 
However, the two cases before the House in Looseley149 both concerned police officers. 
Therefore, the focus of the House of Lords was the remedy when the state had entrapped 
someone. It does not follow that the same remedy should apply where a private citizen has 
entrapped a suspect. 
 
In R v Maxwell,150 the Supreme Court held that it was settled law that there are two categories of 
cases that permit a court to stay a prosecution as an abuse of process. The first is where they 
conclude that it is impossible for a defendant to receive a fair trial. The second is where ‘it 
offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the particular 
circumstances of the case’.151 While entrapment could theoretically be placed in the first category, 
it is more usual to consider it belonging to the second category. The Supreme Court noted that 
the essence of this category is, ‘the court is considered to protect the integrity of the criminal 
justice system…[a] stay will be granted where the court concludes that in all the circumstances a 
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trial will offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety’.152 Sir Brian Leveson P. in R v Crawley153 
rearticulated this: 
 
The second limb concerns the integrity of the criminal justice system and applies where 
the Court considers that the accused should not be standing trial at all, irrespective of the 
potential fairness of the trial itself.154 
 
The Court of Appeal has stated that part of this principle is that the ‘ends do not necessarily 
justify the means’.155 While, theoretically, this could apply to both the actions of a private citizen 
and the state, the Court of Appeal was clear it was principally referring to the actions of the state, 
and that a stay should be granted where ‘it is an affront to the public conscience on account of 
the improper conduct of state agents’.156  
 
Hofmeyr, cites John Finnis in support of her argument that the principle that the state must not 
act improperly forms part of the rule of law, which requires accountability and officials using 
their power in accordance with the law.157 This can be summarised as the principle that nobody 
is above the law.158 Ashworth agrees, noting ‘those who enforce the law should also obey the 
law’.159 Both argue that this means the integrity of the criminal justice system is based on the 
actions of the state and not the actions of a private citizen. Hofmeyr argues that it is the content 
of the law, institutional design and official conduct that undermines the law. In terms of 
entrapment, she argues that the law does not become involved until after the private citizen has 
acted. Presumably, Hofmeyr means that a private citizen has no special powers or requirements 
to act in a particular way. As they have no duty to investigate or prevent crime, their actions are 
not undermining the rule of law until the point at which they unfairly entrap a suspect.  
 
In TL, the Court of Appeal held that it would be extremely rare that the actions of a private 
citizen could sustain a stay for abuse of process. The Court of Appeal referred to it applying ‘in 
theory’ because ‘the underlying purpose of the doctrine of abuse of process is not present’.160 
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The Court of Appeal approved the judgment of Goldring J. in Heath Care Professionals v General 
Medical Council where he ruled that the actions of the private citizen would have to be ‘deeply 
offensive to ordinary notions of fairness’, ‘an affront to the public conscience’ or ‘so seriously 
improper as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute’.161 Goldring J. had noted that 
there was no reported case of this threshold being met, something that the Court of Appeal 
found ‘unsurprising’. 
 
The Court of Appeal could not be clearer about how high the threshold for misconduct is. There 
has, in fact, been one reported case where misconduct by a private citizen has reached this level. 
In fairness to Goldring J., the case was heard eight years’ after his observation. The case 
concerns the investigative journalist Mazher Mahmood, who was the journalist involved in the 
case of Shannon. This time, however, the case concerned the prosecution of Tulisa Contostavlos 
(a former singer), who was accused of being complicit in the supply of drugs.162 Mahmood, by 
now, had been responsible for several ‘stings’ on behalf of the News of the World, but by the 
time of the trial, his star was on the wane as his actions had led to criminal trials collapsing, 
convictions being quashed and he was widely accepted to have given unconvincing evidence 
before the Leveson Inquiry.163 
 
Contostavlos had been flown first-class to America, given a limousine service, a suite at a top 
hotel and a suggestion of multi-million-pound film contacts. One role that she was going to be 
offered involved a gritty, street-wise girl coming from an area where drugs were known. 
Eventually, Mahmood captured her on film saying that she had previously taken and dealt in 
drugs. A friend of hers supplied some cocaine. Contostavlos argued that the admissions had to 
be taken in the context of the part that she was being offered and was, in essence, her 
demonstrating ‘character’. 
 
The defence sought to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process but the trial judge, HHJ 
McCreath, refused to do so saying that ‘there is a world of difference between the court feeling a 
sense of distaste at the journalistic methods of Mr Mahmood…and on the other, the court being 
so outraged by his conduct as to be driven to stay the indictment’.164 However, a short time later, 
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evidence was discovered that suggested that Contostavlos had previously indicated a strong 
dislike for drugs and that it had caused problems for family members. A witness statement that 
made reference to this was altered, apparently by Mahmood, and so the defence was unaware of 
these comments, which would undoubtedly help their case. 
 
Judge McCreath revisited the stay, and this time decided that it was appropriate to order a stay. 
There was evidence that the sting had gone further than had been explained, but, more 
importantly, there was the clear evidence that a witness statement had been changed to remove 
exculpatory statements. The judge held that this was one of those rare instances when the 
integrity of the justice system was compromised, something that would be difficult to argue 
against.165 
 
The cases of TL and Slusalarczik do not come anywhere close to this threshold. As noted earlier, 
in TL, there was no entrapment. In Slusalarczik there is an arguable case that the defendant was 
entrapped, although it will be remembered from the earlier discussion, that it is not certain that it 
constituted entrapment. Judge Blair said, ‘I consider that Mr Webb’s conduct was sufficiently 
gross misconduct as to require me to stay this prosecution’.166 That, it is submitted, is wrong. 
Judge Blair fell into the trap defined by Judge McCreath. It was clear that Judge Blair had ‘clear 
distaste’ for the actions of Webb, but taking the lead on certain parts of a conversation is far 
from the type of ‘gross misconduct’ that the Court of Appeal in TL anticipated. 
 
It is submitted that save for cases akin to the misconduct in Constostavlos; it is unlikely that the 
actions of a paedophile hunter will constitute sufficiently gross misconduct as to bring the 
criminal justice system into disrepute. Taking the lead, pushing or badgering a suspect does not 
constitute ‘gross misconduct’ of the sort required by the law. That does not mean there is no 
remedy where a paedophile hunter entraps a suspect, as the remedy lies in the exclusion of 
evidence.  
 
Section 78 was expressly mentioned in R v Looseley and the presumption for a stay should be put 
in the context of those facts being state entrapment. Section 78 is designed to ensure a fair trial, 
by permitting evidence to be excluded, inter alia, where it has been unfairly gathered. Section 78 
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requires a different test from a stay, but rightly so. The judge must decide whether that evidence, 
including the circumstances of its gathering, would have ‘such an adverse effect on the fairness 
of proceedings that the court ought not to admit it’.  
 
The Court of Appeal in Shannon considered whether the judge had rightly rejected an argument 
under s.78. The Court ultimately agreed with the judge’s ruling (in that there was no evidence of 
entrapment), they accepted that s.78 was an appropriate remedy for private entrapment. It is 
quite possible in Slusalarczik that Judge Blair would have excluded some, or all, of Webb’s 
evidence, not least because it is clear that the learned judge believed that he went too far and that 
there was unfairness in his conduct. If he did so, the same result (the acquittal of the defendant) 
would have almost certainly occurred as his evidence was crucial to the prosecution proving their 
case. It is was perhaps this fact that led to the prosecution not appealing the stay.167 
 
However, that would not be the position in all cases. Let us take an example: 
 
PH is pretending to be a 14-year-old girl called ‘Rebecca’ and is chatting to D on the 
internet. For our example, we can assume that PH has gone beyond what would 
ordinarily be permitted by initiating the sexual element into the discussion first. D turns 
up to the meet whereupon the police arrest him. In his possession are some flowers that 
have a card saying ‘To Rebecca xxx’, a teddy-bear and some condoms. 
 
In this example, a judge may take the view that the chatroom transcript is prejudicial evidence 
and she exercises her discretion to exclude it under s.78. Assuming that D is charged with 
attempting to commit s.15, Sexual Offences Act 2003,168 an application that there is no case to 
answer would not necessarily succeed even with the transcript excluded. The elements required 
of the offence are: 
 
• D has communicated with another person (B). 
• D meets, travels with the intention of meeting B or arranges to meet B, or B 
travels to meet D. 
• At that meeting, D intends to do an act that would constitute a child sex offence. 
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• D (believes) B is under the age of 16.169 
 
All of this can be proven without the transcript of the chat. Even if the transcript itself is 
excluded, the communications data accompanying it170 will prove that there was a conversation, 
and nothing within s.15 requires that the communication is sexual. D’s presence at the meeting 
will show that he intended to meet B, as would the flowers with ‘Rebecca’ on them. The 
condoms are evidence that could be put forward to the jury, in combination with the other 
possessions, and any admissions made in the interview, as evidence on which they could conclude 




The Court of Appeal decision in TL is to be welcomed because it helped to clarify the correct 
approach to dealing with the activities of paedophile hunters. Not all will agree because it leaves 
open the acceptance of evidence from paedophile hunters. As noted at the beginning of this 
article, the police strongly disapprove the ‘work’ of paedophile hunters and believe that it is 
unhelpful. In TL the Court of Appeal, while overturning the stay of prosecution, concluded by 
saying: 
 
 In reaching this conclusion, we do not seek to undermine or contradict the stated 
position of the police, by which they discourage [paedophile hunters]. [The police] have 
concerns that…the zeal of some "vigilantes" may lead them to seriously improper 
conduct. It would be much better for [paedophile hunters] immediately they have 
suspicions about the conduct of an identifiable individual to involve the police and leave 
them to investigate.171 
 
Does condemnation go far enough? Theoretically, the Court of Appeal could have decided that 
relying on the evidence gathered by vigilantes constitutes an abuse of process. However, it is not 
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really for the courts to tackle paedophile hunters. The courts have, for some time, become 
accustomed to holding their proverbial nose while listening to the evidence. Whether the courts 
should hear the evidence of paedophile hunters is a policy decision, and, therefore, one for the 
government and not the courts. 
 
The police have a real concern about the activities of paedophile hunters and the risk that they 
could pose to their operations and, indeed, to those suspected of a crime. Anecdotally, at least, 
there appears to be public support for their activities, and it would be a brave government that 
sought to ban their activities. England & Wales has a long history of private citizens becoming 
involved in the detection of crime, particularly in respect of fraud and theft..172 It would be 
difficult to identify a rule that only tackled paedophile hunters and which did not, at the same 
time, tackle private investigations into other forms of crime. 
 
In the absence of a ban, the courts must do what they can to balance the need to prosecute those 
who have potentially committed serious crimes with the rights of those coerced into committing 
a crime. TL could be seen as a fudge, but if it is, then it is in good company. The relationship 
between the police and paedophile hunters is undoubtedly  complicated, in that they dislike the 
activities of the hunters, but they cannot ignore evidence passed to them. To that extent, the 
criminal justice system reluctantly acquiesces to the activities of paedophile hunters. 
 
If the activities of paedophile hunters are to be accepted, how are people protected from being 
tricked into committing a criminal offence? While a stay for abuse of process remains technically 
possible, the Court of Appeal in TL was right to say that it is more theoretical than practical. It 
requires conduct that is so wrong as to bring the criminal justice system into disrepute, a high 
threshold. The courts should instead use their powers to ensure a fair trial. Where that means 
excluding evidence gathered unfairly, then they should do so. That is what should have happened 
in Slusalarczik, and it will mean that individuals are protected from those who go too far, while, at 
the same time, ensuring punishment for those who willingly seek to meet a child for sexual 
purposes. 
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